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AUSTRALIA AS AN ARBITRATION-FRIENDLY 
COUNTRY: THE TENSION BETWEEN PARTY 
AUTONOMY AND FINALITY 
Louise Parsons & Jack Leonard
ABSTRACT 
The landmark decision of the High Court of Australia in the 
recent case of TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v The 
Judges of the Federal Court of Australia [2013] HCA 5 reinforced 
the importance of the principle of party autonomy in international 
commercial arbitration in Australia. The case was highly 
acclaimed as a case that confirmed Australia as an “arbitration-
friendly” country. This article examines the tension between the 
interest in finality and enforcement of arbitral awards, and the 
interest in a quality award. The first interest would generally argue 
against contractual expansion of judicial review clauses in the 
arbitration agreement; by contrast the second interest would 
support a contractual mechanism for the review of arbitral awards 
and contractually expanded judicial review clauses. By enforcing 
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contractually expanded judicial review clauses, the interests of the 
“winner” (with an interest in finality and enforcement) and the 
shared interests of both parties in a quality award (irrespective of 
them being winner or loser) will be protected. 
This article argues that Australia may be arbitration-friendly 
from the point of view that arbitral awards will be enforced, but 
that it may only be fully “arbitration-friendly” if there is the 
possibility to enforce contractually expanded review clauses. A 
country that protects both the interest in finality and enforcement 
of arbitral awards and the interest in the quality of arbitral awards, 
and will further give full effect to the meaning of party autonomy in 
the context of arbitration as a contractual form of dispute 
resolution, will be a truly arbitration-friendly country. 
KEYWORDS: arbitration, finality, party autonomy, review, Australia, 
extended review clause 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent decision of the High Court of Australia (High Court) in TCL 
Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v The Judges of the Federal Court of 
Australia 1 [hereinafter TCL Aircon], has been applauded as a landmark 
decision for arbitration in Australia, 2  confirming Australia as an 
“arbitration-friendly” country.3 Although the phrase “arbitration-friendly” 
generally refers to the attributes of a legal system that recognises and 
protects alternative dispute resolution as a means of resolving disputes 
outside of the national court system by enforcing arbitral awards, that may 
not be the only meaning of “arbitration-friendly” that would matter to a 
prospective party to arbitration.  
This article explores the tension between the interest in the finality and 
enforcement of arbitral awards (which may disallow contractually 
expanded judicial review clauses) and the interest in the quality and review 
of arbitral awards (which would support contractually expanded judicial 
review clauses). 
This article analyses the decision in TCL Aircon from the perspective 
of the parties entering into an international arbitration agreement that will 
be subject to Australian law. It considers whether it would be possible 
under Australian law for the parties to avoid by agreement the immediate 
enforceability of the arbitral award, and instead have an enforceable 
contractually expanded review clause that allows for review of the decision 
of the arbitral tribunal in certain circumstances. It should be noted that the 
High Court of Australia in TCL Aircon emphasised the importance of party 
autonomy, although the court did not specifically consider review under 
Art 34 of the Model Law.4 If contractually expanded review clauses were 
not to be enforced in Australia, the phrase “arbitration-friendly” would 
mean “friendly” to the winner only. This article will then consider the 
relationship between finality and enforcement of arbitral awards on the one 
hand, and the interest of parties in quality and review of awards on the 
other hand. 
It is proposed that to be truly “arbitration-friendly” Australia as a 
jurisdiction should allow contractually expanded review clauses in 
international arbitration agreements. Such a position is not inconsistent 
with the decision in TCL Aircon and is also not inconsistent with the 
                                                        
1 TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v. The Judges of the Federal Court of Australia 
S178/2012, [2013] HCA 5 (Austl.) [hereinafter TCL Aircon]. 
2 Articles reporting on this case have been enthusiastic. See infra note 37 and accompanying   
discussion. 
3 Id. 
4 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with amendments as 
adopted in 2006 [hereinafter the Model Law]. 
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provisions of the Model Law and the International Arbitration Act 1974 
(Cth). Australia may be more “arbitration-friendly” if parties were allowed 
full autonomy to specify the binding nature of their arbitral award. 
II. RECENT CHANGES TO THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN AUSTRALIA 
The past five years witnessed significant effort in improving 
Australia’s reputation and standing as a desired or even preferred 
destination for international arbitration. The changes to the International 
Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) and the legislative framework for arbitration in 
Australia in 2010 incorporating the 2006 amendments to the Model Law 
into the Australian law in respect of international arbitration, was received 
positively. 5  Notably, following the 2010 amendments, parties selecting 
Australian law for their international arbitration cannot contract out of the 
Model Law. The decision of the High Court of Australia in TCL Aircon on 
a matter involving international commercial arbitration in Australia was in 
the spotlight because the High Court of Australia had to decide on a 
challenge to the constitutional validity of the International Arbitration Act 
1974 (Cth) and the finality and enforceability of arbitral awards handed 
down under Australian law. An adverse decision would have been 
detrimental to international commercial arbitration in Australia. As this is 
the most recent and most important decision of the High Court of Australia 
on international arbitration, it is useful to commence this paper with a 
discussion of this decision of the High Court of Australia - TCL Aircon.6 
III. THE LANDMARK DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT OF 
AUSTRALIA IN TCL AIR CONDITIONER (ZHONGSHAN) CO LTD V 
THE JUDGES OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA [2013] 
HCA 5 
A. The Dispute between TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd 
and Castel Electronics 
The High Court decision in TCL Aircon7 in 2013 formed only part of 
the history of the dispute between the parties. In addition to the High Court 
proceedings, multiple proceedings were initiated by TCL Air Conditioner 
(Zhongshan) Co Ltd (TCL) against Castel Electronics (Castel) in the 
                                                        
5  See generally e.g., James Whittaker et al., Australia, in THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
REVIEW 35 (James H Carter ed., 3rd. ed., 2012).  
6 See generally TCL Aircon. 
7 Id. 
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Federal Court of Australia, as well as in the Victorian Supreme Court;8 
these were in addition to the original arbitral proceedings. 
Castel, an Australian-based company, commenced arbitral proceedings 
against TCL, a company based in China, in Melbourne, Victoria, on 25 
July 2008 in accordance with the arbitration clause contained in the 
General Distribution Agreement entered into between the parties.9  
Under the General Distribution Agreement, TCL granted Castel 
exclusive distribution rights of TCL-manufactured air conditioners in 
Australia. Castel alleged that TCL had breached this contract by selling 
what was referred to as “Other Equipment Manufacturer” (hereinafter 
OEM) products in this exclusive jurisdiction.10 TCL manufactured products 
under different brand names and distributed these in Australia. The three-
member Tribunal rendered two awards. The first one was on 23 December 
2010, ordering TCL to pay Castel $2,874,870 for breach of contract. The 
second award was rendered on 27 January 2011 for $732,500 in costs.11 
TCL defaulted on payment of the awards and Castel instituted proceedings 
in the Federal Court to seek enforcement of the arbitral awards.12 
B. Federal Court Proceedings 
At the same time, TCL initiated Federal Court action to set aside the 
awards of the arbitral tribunal for a violation of public policy.13 TCL’s 
claim was that the Tribunal had failed to correctly assess Castel’s loss from 
TCL’s sale of OEM products in Australia. In the arbitration, the parties’ 
expert witnesses had proposed vastly different substitution ratios between 
TCL branded products, distributed by Castel, and OEM products, sold by 
TCL. Castel’s expert witness suggested that the substitution rate between 
the two systems was 100%; TCL’s expert opined that this figure was 7.4%. 
The Tribunal found that both of these expert opinions were unreliable and 
instead relied on lay evidence to conclude that Castel’s lost sales amounted 
to 22.5% of the OEM products sold in Australia. The final award of 
damages was calculated based on this figure. TCL argued in the Federal 
Court that in rejecting the expert evidence brought by Castel, the Tribunal 
                                                        
8 See generally TCL Airconditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v. Castel Electronics Pty Ltd, [2009] VSC 
553 (Austl.); Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v. TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd, [2013] FCA 
131(Austl.); Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v. TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd (No 2), [2012] 
FCA 1214 (Austl.); Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v. TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd (No 3), 
[2012] FCA 1282 (Austl.). 
9 Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v. TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd (No 2), [2012] FCA 1214, 
¶ 67 (Austl.). 
10 Id. ¶ 1. 
11 Id. ¶ 2. This value was actually the net payment after Castel made payments to TCL arising from 
counter-claims.  
12 Id. ¶ 3. 
13 Id. 
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was bound to accept the expert evidence of TCL. TCL claimed that the 
Tribunal instead plucked the figure “from the air”,14 relying on no evidence. 
TCL contended that this violated two rules of natural justice,15 namely the 
no evidence rule,16 and the hearing rule.17 The decision of Murphy J was 
that there had been no breach of natural justice. He also set out general 
principles relating to the public policy exception to enforcement of arbitral 
awards in the IAA.18 
C. The Matter before the High Court of Australia 
Prior to the decision of the Federal Court, TCL commenced 
proceedings in the original jurisdiction of the High Court, challenging the 
constitutional validity of the IAA.  
TCL argued that the inability of the Federal Court under Articles 35 
and 36 of the Model Law19 to refuse to enforce an arbitral award on the 
grounds of an error of law on the face of the award was a breach of Chapter 
III of the Constitution.20 TCL contended that the Federal Court could not be 
required knowingly to perpetrate legal error as this undermined the 
institutional integrity of the Court. Further, TCL argued that the IAA 
“impermissibly confers the judicial power of the Commonwealth on the 
arbitral tribunal that made the award, by giving the arbitral tribunal the last 
word on the law applied in deciding the dispute submitted to arbitration”. 21 
TCL also argued that “the undermining of the institutional integrity of the 
Federal Court was compounded further by the fact that the arbitral award 
that was to be enforced by the Federal Court, in spite of any legal error that 
may appear on its face, was one that Article 28 of the Model Law, or an 
implied term of the arbitration agreement, requires to be correct in law.”22 
                                                        
14 Id. ¶ 135. 
15 It was argued that it therefore fell within the public policy exception at Article 34(2)(b)(ii). 
16 Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v. TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd (No 2), [2012] FCA 
1214, ¶ 136 (Austl.). 
17 Id. ¶ 157.  
18 Id. ¶ 186; See also Albert Monichino & Alex Fawke, International Arbitration in Australia: 
2012/2013 in Review, 24 AUSTRALASIAN DISP. RESOL. J. 208, 211 (2013). Where enforcement and 
the seat of arbitration are in the same state then the meaning of “public policy” under Article 34 is 
taken to be the same as under Art 36. Further, s 19(b) of the IAA should be construed to read that 
any breach of natural justice will be contrary to Articles 34 and 36 of the Model Law. The court 
should only use its discretion to set aside an award where fundamental notions of justice or fairness 
have been offended. 
19 The IAA Amendment Act incorporated the 2006 amendments to the Model Law, and the judges 
in the case of TCL Aircon referred to the Model Law and the IAA interchangeably. 
20 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, July 9, 1900. 
21 TCL Aircon, ¶ 4. 
22 Id. 
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The High Court unanimously23  rejected the constitutional challenge 
and held that: 
(1) The IAA did not confer judicial power on the arbitral tribunal, and
that there is a clear distinction between judicial power and arbitral power.
Judicial power is conferred by law and exercised coercively whilst an
arbitral tribunal derives its authority from the voluntary agreement between
the parties.24  Therefore the making of an award by an arbitral tribunal
pursuant to the Model Law25 (or the IAA which incorporates the Model
Law) 26  does not amount to an exercise of the judicial power of the
Commonwealth;27
(2) There was no impairment of the institutional integrity of the court
by the court enforcing awards with potential errors of law. The integrity of
the court was protected by the existence of grounds for refusing
enforcement of an arbitral award under Articles 36 of the Model Law. The
High Court did not see the ability to review errors of law as a requirement
for institutional integrity;28
(3) Awards made by arbitral tribunals are final and binding. The
plurality held that “an award made by an arbitrator pursuant to such
authority is final and conclusive”29 and that the underlying reason for its
finality is to be found in party autonomy;30
(4) The arbitral award is enforceable under the Model Law because it
represents the tribunal’s decision on the disputes voluntarily submitted to
arbitration; 31
(5) Party autonomy is the foundation of arbitration as well as finality
in arbitration;32 and
(6) Article 28 of the Model Law does not require the award to be
correct in law.33
In the examination of the tension between the importance of finality 
and enforcement of arbitral awards, and the interest in quality and review 
of awards in Australia, this article focuses on three important points 
confirmed by the decision in TCL Aircon: first, that the Australian Federal 
arbitration legislation34 is not unconstitutional35 and second, that as arbitral 
23 Id. ¶¶ 40, 111. 
24 Id. ¶¶ 27-32, 75-77, 106-07. 
25 See generally the Model Law.  
26 International Arbitration Act, 1974, (Cth) sch. 2 (Austl.) [hereinafter IAA]. 
27 TCL Aircon, ¶¶ 27-32, 75-77, 106-107. 
28 Id. ¶¶ 32-34, 103-105. 
29 Id. ¶¶ 81-99, 105. 
30 Id. ¶¶ 13, 15, 17. 
31 Id. ¶¶ 17, 51-53. 
32 Id. ¶¶ 11-16, 45, 78, 109. 
33 Id. ¶¶ 14, 16, 53, 73-74; Monichino & Fawke, supra note 18, at 212. 
34 See generally IAA. 
35 TCL Aircon, ¶¶ 40, 111. Any legislation contrary to the Australian Constitution will be void. 
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awards will not be refused enforcement on the ground that the award 
contains an error in law, Australian law respects party autonomy and 
finality in arbitral awards. 36  The second of these two points will be 
discussed first. The third important point, that there is no duty on an 
arbitrator to make a decision that is correct in law, will be examined 
thereafter. 
D. Confirmation of the Finality and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
Evokes a Positive Reaction to the Decision in TCL Aircon 
The decision in TCL Aircon that supported finality and enforcement of 
arbitral awards under Australian law has been applauded as a landmark 
decision for arbitration in Australia, 37  confirming Australia as an 
“arbitration-friendly” country.38 The positive reaction stems mostly from 
36 Id, ¶ 111. 
37 Articles reporting on this case have been enthusiastic. See for example the following, mostly 
from prominent Australian and international law firms and the arbitration community: A Plus for 
Australian Arbitration: TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v The Judges Of The Federal 
Court Of Australia [2013] HCA 5, TIMEBASE (Mar. 20, 2013, 9.19 AM) http://www.timebase. 
com.au/news/2013/AT213-article.html; Mark D. Chapple et al., International arbitration in 
Australia is safe: the High Court of Australia confirms the validity of the International Arbitration 
Act, BAKER & MCKENZIE (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g 
=d8d743f3-9b45-4c02-b9cc-cf4b9306d2a3; Deborah Tomkinson & Tomoyuki Hachigo, Not 
arbitrary in the least: Arbitral Awards and the TCL judgment, 87(11) L. INST. J. (2013), 
http://acica.org.au/assets/media/Resources/LIV-November-2013-Tomkinson-Hachigo.pdf; Khory 
McCormick & I-Ching Tseng, A win for international trade – High Court dismisses challenge to 
International Arbitration Act, MINTERELLISON (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.minterellison.com/ 
publications/a-win-for-international-trade-high-court-dismisses-challenge-to-international-
arbitration-act/; Peter Ward et al., High Court upholds Australia's international arbitration laws, 
ASHURST (July 2013), http://www.ashurst.com/publication-item.aspx?id_Content=9313; 
International arbitration in Australia is safe: the High Court of Australia confirms the validity of 
the International Arbitration Act, BAKER & MCKENZIE (Mar. 14, 2013), http://bakerxchange.com/ 
rv/ff000e96d5272a1d72da1c709649af9deec79adb; High Court of Australia dismisses challenge to 
legislation incorporating the UNCITRAL Model Law, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Mar. 13, 2013, 
2:27 AM), http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2013/03/13/high-court-of-australia-dismisses-challenge-
to-legislation-incorporating-the-uncitral-model-law/; Court delivers landmark judgment for 
Australian arbitration, CLAYTON UTZ (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.claytonutz.com/publications/ 
news/201303/13/court_delivers_landmark_judgment_for_australian_arbitration.page. 
38 See for example: Focus: courts uphold arbitration laws in Australia, ALLENS (Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://www.allens.com.au/pubs/arb/foarb21mar13.htm; Albert Monichino, Insight: International 
arbitration: sheep, wolves and vegetarianism – a view from Down Under, INTERNATIONAL BAR 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=072c5f50-9676-460f-8ac2-
ecc36347f8a9 (last visited Nov. 9, 2014); Albert Monichino & Luke Nottage, Blowing hot and cold 
on the International Arbitration Act, 51 L. SOC’Y J., 56 (May, 2013), available at 
http://barristers.com.au/ wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Blowing-Hot-Cold-on-The-International-
Arbitration-Act.pdf; Albert Monichino, Australia: Today's decision of the apex court, GLOBAL 
ARB. REV. (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.vicbar.com.au/GetFile.ashx?file=InBriefFiles%  
2FMonichino_case_note_apex_ court.pdf; High Court confirms recognition and enforcement in 
Australia of arbitral awards, MORAY & AGNEW (Aug. 14, 2013), 
http://commercial.moray.com.au/publication/high-court-confirms-recognition-and-enforcement-in-
australia-of-arbitral-awards/. 
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the first two points referred to above – namely (1) the confirmation of the 
constitutionality of the IAA, and (2) the respect for and observation of 
finality in arbitral awards on the basis of the acceptance of the doctrine of 
party autonomy in arbitration. The potential impact of the decision of the 
High Court in TCL Aircon clearly extended beyond the immediate rights 
and interests of the parties directly involved in the case, because a decision 
by the High Court that rendered the IAA unconstitutional, would have 
undone years of work and would likely have been detrimental to 
Australia’s standing in the international commercial arbitration world. The 
importance of this decision was reflected in the significant number of 
parties that sought leave to intervene and to appear as amici curiae. Apart 
from submissions of the Attorneys-General for the Commonwealth, 
Queensland, South Australia, Victoria, Western Australia and New South 
Wales, joint submissions were lodged by ACICA39, IAMA40 and CIArb 
Australia41 (hereinafter the Arbitral Bodies42) who did so “in support of, 
and to uphold the framework for, international arbitration including the 
enforcement of arbitral awards in Australia”.43  
The interest of the Arbitral Bodies in this case is not unprecedented. 
Previously, the Arbitral Bodies, together with the Australian International 
Dispute Centre, were granted leave to act as amici curiae in the case of 
Westport Insurance Corporation v Gordian Runoff Ltd (Westport).44 In that 
case, the rationale for intervening was to provide submissions “from a 
specialised viewpoint, [and] an industry perspective or [to act] in the public 
interest”.45 Similarly, in the case of TCL Aircon, the Arbitral Bodies were 
“in a position to assist the Court on relevant matters of vital importance to 
international arbitration in Australia”,46 just as they did in Westport.  
The Arbitral Bodies’ interest in TCL Aircon was comparable to that in 
Westport because the case had the potential “to substantially affect the 
interests of ACICA”,47 and by implication the other two arbitral bodies. 
The intervention of arbitral bodies as amici curiae in court cases 
concerning international arbitration legislation is not a novel occurrence. 
For example, the Arbitral Bodies cited not only other Australian cases 
                                                        
39 Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration [hereinafter ACICA]. 
40 Institute of Mediators & Arbitrators Australia [hereinafter IAMA]. 
41 Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Australia [hereinafter CIArb Australia]. 
42  ACICA, IAMA and CIArb Australia refer to themselves as the “Arbitral Bodies” in their 
submissions as amici curiae in Joint Submissions as Amici Curiae by ACICA, IAMA and CIArb 
Australia, Oct. 26, 2012. 
43 Joint Submissions as Amici Curiae by ACICA, IAMA and CIArb Australia, at 3, Oct. 26, 2012.  
44 Westport Insurance Corporation v. Gordian Runoff Limited, [2011] HCA 37 (Autsl.). 
45 Joint Submissions as Amici Curiae by ACICA, AIDC, IAMA and CIArb Australia, at 5, Jan. 25, 
2011.  
46 ACICA et al., supra note 43, at 5. 
47 Id. 
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(such as Westport) but also international cases48 in which arbitral bodies 
intervened as amici curiae. The intervention of the Arbitral Bodies in TCL 
Aircon seems of particular importance given that if the plaintiff were to 
succeed, the IAA would effectively be declared unconstitutional, and 
Australia would resort back to the previous, pre-Model Law, legislative 
position. 
Although the High Court did not specifically set out any “public policy” 
reasons for the decision, the submissions of the amici curiae highlighted 
the importance of international commercial arbitration in Australia. 
The significance of the decision in the case of TCL Aircon is further 
reflected in the positive reaction of legal practitioners and the arbitral 
institutions to the TCL Aircon decision. This reaction should be seen 
against the background of the amendments to Australian arbitration laws in 
2010 referred to above. The changes to Australian arbitration law in 2010 
were promoted by the lobbying of the arbitral institutions. 49  The 
amendments to the IAA in 2010 were at least to some extent motivated by 
the desire to promote Australia as a hub for international arbitration in the 
Asia-Pacific region – especially as Hong Kong and Singapore were both 
growing rapidly as destinations for international commercial arbitration.50 
For both clients and legal professionals advising clients, as well as the 
Arbitral Bodies and the individual arbitrators in Australia that may have 
had a financial interest in Australia as a seat of arbitration, much was at 
stake with the outcome of TCL Aircon. Similar considerations also 
informed the lobbying by the institutions involved in arbitration in 
Australia at the time of the legislative amendments in 2010.51 Singapore 
and Hong Kong are popular destinations for international arbitration and 
provide direct competition for Australia in the region.52 
The International Arbitration Amendment Act53 provided a boost to 
international arbitration in Australia when it was passed and it has 
                                                        
48 Id. 
49 See generally Peter Megens & Adam Peters, International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) 
– Towards a New Brand of Australian International Arbitration, 2 W. AUSTL. JURIST 149 (2011). 
For a list of all the submissions received by the Attorney-General in the process of amending the 
IAA, see REFORMS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ACT 1974, ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S 
DEPARTMENT ARCHIVE, http://www.ag.gov.au/consultations/pages/Reformstothe 
InternationalArbitrationAct1974.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).  
50 See generally Monichino & Nottage, supra note 38. See also INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN 
AUSTRALIA 1 (Luke Nottage & Richard Garnett eds., 2010). 
51 See generally Standing Committee of Attorneys General, Reform of the uniform Commercial 
Arbitration Acts – section 27D mediation clause (2011), 
http://www.lccsc.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/sclj/documents/pdf/issuespaper_consultation_s27d_caa.pdf.  
52 Singapore appears to be the leading seat for international arbitration in Asia. See Choice of the 
Seat of Arbitration, 2012 International Arbitration Survey: Current and Preferred Practices in the 
Arbitral Process, WHITE & CASE, http://arbitrationpractices.whitecase.com/news/newsdetail.aspx? 
news=3787 (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). 
53 International Arbitration Amendment Act, 2010 (Cth) (Austl.). 
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improved Australia’s standing as a desirable destination for international 
arbitration.54 The importance of the role of the IAA has been acknowledged 
by the High Court because of the role it plays (together with the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards55 and 
the Model Law) through the facilitation of “the use of arbitration 
agreements and the curial recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
made in relation to international trade and commerce”.56 The High Court in 
TCL Aircon further emphasised the importance of arbitration in 
international commerce referring to the importance of the New York 
Convention 57  and the Model Law 58  that deal with “one of the most 
important aspects of international commerce – the resolution of disputes 
between commercial parties in an international or multinational context”.59 
Further, the High Court confirmed that “[a]n ordered efficient dispute 
resolution mechanism leading to an enforceable award or judgment by the 
adjudicator, is an essential underpinning of commerce”.60 
There are multiple benefits derived from Australia being a popular 
destination for arbitration and for Australian law to be selected as the law 
of the arbitration agreement.61 As arbitration is a fee-based service, the 
benefits extend to all those professionally involved with arbitration but also 
others such as hospitality services providers, airlines and the like.62 The 
impact is augmented in light of the fact that alternative dispute resolution is, 
according to a recent survey, the preferred method of dispute resolution in 
international commercial contracts in many industries.63  
Consequently, the reaction to and electronic media publications 
following TCL Aircon celebrated the decision for its support of arbitration 
and the acceptance by the highest court in Australia of the final and binding 
                                                        
54 See generally Benjamin Hayward, Pro-arbitration Policy in the Australian Courts the End of 
Eisenwerk?, 41 (2) FED. L. REV. 299 (2013). See for example also the positive reaction of China to 
Australia’s bid to promote itself as a destination for arbitration following the 2010 amendments: 
China Welcomes Oz as Arbitration Destination, LAWYER’S WEEKLY (July 19, 2010), 
http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/china-welcomes-oz-as-arbitration-destination. 
55 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 7, 1959, 330 
UNTS 38; 21 UST 2517; 7 ILM 1046 (1968) (opened for signature June 10, 1958) [hereinafter 
New York Convention].  
56 TCL Aircon, ¶ 41. 
57 See generally New York Convention. 
58 See generally the Model Law.  
59 TCL Aircon, ¶ 10. 
60 Id.  
61 Hayward, supra note 54, at 301. Arbitration is a business. 
62 See generally e.g., Michael McIlwrath & General Electric Company, Can Arbitration Keep Up? 
Singapore Ratchets Up Forum Competition, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Oct. 31, 2013), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/10/31/can-arbitration-keep-up-singapore-forum-
competition/. 
63 See generally Corporate Choices in International Arbitration Industry Perspectives, PWC (2013), 
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/arbitration-dispute-resolution/assets/pwc-international-arbitration-
study.pdf. 
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nature of arbitral awards. Judging by these publications, what “arbitration-
friendly” seems to indicate is that Australia will enforce arbitral awards – 
thereby clearly supporting finality and enforcement in arbitration.  
This means that for the party in whose favour the dispute is resolved, 
Australia will certainly be “arbitration-friendly”. From this point of view, 
Australia as a country can accordingly be designated as ‘arbitration-
friendly’ because it supports the interest of parties in finality and the 
enforcement of arbitral awards and because both the Australian legislative 
framework and Australia’s highest court support the doctrine of party 
autonomy in international arbitration. This is something that parties 
entering into an arbitration agreement may consider. 
IV. CAN AUSTRALIA BE “ARBITRATION-FRIENDLY” IF THERE IS 
NO RECOURSE AGAINST AN INCORRECT AWARD AND NO 
PROTECTION FOR THE QUALITY OF ARBITRAL AWARDS? 
The third important point that the High Court made in TCL Aircon was 
that there is no duty on an arbitrator to render an award that is correct in 
fact or law.64 The High Court, at the same time, also confirmed that arbitral 
awards in Australia are final and not subject to appeal, and that there is no 
implied term in the arbitration agreement that the arbitrator should make a 
finding that is correct at law. 65  The High Court pointed out that the 
principle that there is no obligation to make a correct award underpins the 
operation of the Model Law and therefore the IAA, and that this principle 
has been an important premise of the Model Law as is reflected in the 
working papers of the UNCITRAL working group for the preparation of 
the Model Law.66  
                                                        
64 See for example the article with a somewhat sensationalist title: Arbitration in Australia: an 
arbitrator’s right to be wrong, KING & WOOD MALLESONS (Mar. 13 2013), 
http://www.mallesons.com/publications/marketAlerts/2013/Pages/Arbitration-in-Australia-an-
arbitrators-right-to-be-wrong.aspx. TCL Aircon, ¶ 17. Of course, arbitral awards that include errors 
of law may create a range of problems for the parties involved. 
65 TCL Aircon, ¶ 16: “The consequence is that no term limiting an arbitral tribunal to a correct 
application of law is to be implied by force of Australian law in an arbitration agreement within the 
scope of the Model Law”. 
66 Id. ¶ 14:  
The working papers of the UNCITRAL working group for the preparation of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law contain nothing to suggest that the requirement of Art 28 
for an arbitral tribunal to decide "in accordance with" the substantive rules of law 
chosen by the parties was intended to encompass a requirement that the arbitral 
tribunal apply those laws in a manner that a competent court would determine to be 
correct. 
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Potential contracting parties agreeing on arbitration as their method of 
dispute resolution under Australian law may however find it somewhat 
disconcerting that an arbitrator is not prohibited from making errors of fact 
and law. The situation may be exacerbated by the fact that even if an 
arbitral decision is wrong, there is no recourse against the award. Such a 
state of affairs could be potentially grossly unfair towards the party who 
loses in arbitration as a consequence of an error made by the tribunal. 
Therefore, although parties agree to be bound by a decision made by a 
private arbitral tribunal, and therefore inherently accept that ‘justice may 
not be served’ in the case of an incorrect award, the commercial reality of 
parties may dictate that such a situation is not acceptable to one or both of 
them. 
This position can create some difficulties for parties to an arbitration 
agreement because, as confirmed by the High Court in TCL Aircon, they 
“confer upon the arbitrator an authority conclusively to determine [the 
disputes between] them”(emphasis added),67 coupled with “the general rule 
that an award made by an arbitrator pursuant to such authority is final and 
conclusive”.68 It is therefore conceivable that one or both of the parties may 
wish to have the decision of the arbitrator reviewed if the arbitrator’s 
finding is wrong in law or fact. The finality of an arbitral award could 
therefore be to the detriment of one (or both) of the parties to arbitration.  
From the perspective of a party who may be prejudiced by an incorrect 
arbitral award, Australia would therefore not appear to be particularly 
“arbitration-friendly”. 
The TCL Aircon decision however did not consider what the position 
would be where an arbitration agreement contains an express term that the 
arbitrator should apply the law correctly. It also did not address a situation 
where the arbitration agreement contained an express provision that an 
award that was incorrect in fact or law could be subjected to appeal or 
review, or would only be provisionally binding.  
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTEREST IN FINALITY AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
PARTY AUTONOMY – A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Although the High Court in TCL Aircon confirmed that the principle of 
party autonomy fundamentally underpins arbitration, the key question is 
however whether an Australian court will enforce a contractually expanded 
review clause incorporated in an arbitration agreement that is subject to 
                                                        
67 Dobbs v. National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643, 653 (Austl.).as quoted in TCL 
Aircon, ¶ 77. 
68 TCL Aircon, ¶ 78. 
370 7(2) CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 357   [2014 
 
Australian law, or will allow for situations where the arbitral award is not 
immediately binding.  
The High Court in TCL Aircon did not consider a situation where the 
arbitration agreement explicitly provides the parties with a right to have the 
award reviewed, if the award is wrong in fact or law, and thereby to avoid 
immediate enforcement. The TCL Aircon case does not address the 
potential effect of a contractually expanded right of review in an arbitration 
agreement and it is also not clear whether respect for party autonomy by 
Australian courts will extend to the enforcement of a contractually 
expanded review clause. 
The judges in TCL Aircon however reiterated that the finality of 
arbitration is a consequence of party autonomy. Arbitral awards are final 
and binding because the parties choose the awards to be final and binding 
on them. (This is the exercise of a form of private power.69) The logical 
extension of the premise that parties are free to choose to be finally bound 
by arbitral awards is that parties therefore should also be free not to be 
finally bound by arbitral decisions. Put differently, if the finality of arbitral 
awards is found in private power, then equally parties should be able to 
determine that arbitral awards may not be final. The interest in finality and 
enforcement of arbitral awards as well as the interest in review and the 
quality of awards may appear to be in conflict but both stem from the same 
principle – the right of the parties to within limits determine the parameters 
of their arbitration. 
Ultimately, as explained by the High Court of Australia in TCL Aircon, 
an arbitral award is simply a further creature of contract, and assumes the 
form of a further agreement between the parties:  
[T]he arbitrator's making of an award in exercise of such 
authority both extinguishes the original cause of action and 
imposes new obligations on the parties in substitution for the 
rights and liabilities which were the subject of the dispute 
referred to arbitration. The former rights of the parties are 
discharged by an accord and satisfaction. The accord is the 
agreement to submit disputes to arbitration; the satisfaction is 
the making of an award in fulfilment of the agreement to 
arbitrate.70 
The following question arises: If the reason that an arbitral award is 
treated as final is that it is underpinned by the consent of the parties, then 
would denying parties the opportunity to agree to review or appeal an 
                                                        
69 See e.g., TCL Aircon, ¶ 7, Submissions of the Commonwealth Attorney-General (Intervening).  
70 Dobbs v. National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643, 653 (Austl.). 
2014] AUSTRALIA AS AN ARBITRATION-FRIENDLY COUNTRY: THE 
TENSION BETWEEN PARTY AUTONOMY AND FINALITY 
371  
 
award not deny the very fundamental principle on which arbitration is 
based – the principle of party autonomy? A potential inherent contradiction 
could potentially exist between the parties’ interest in finality and 
enforcement, and the parties’ interest in obtaining a quality award, and 
protecting the quality of the award through a review process. Both interests 
serve important purposes for the parties and a balance needs to be struck. 
It is useful at this point to consider the restraints on finality of arbitral 
awards in Australia through the operation of the IAA, which adopts the 
Model Law and New York Convention, with the latter in particular having 
a pro-enforcement policy. The relevant provisions of the IAA71 appear to 
impose statutory limitations on the enforcement of arbitral awards and 
therefore appear to place limitations on party autonomy. As acknowledged 
by the High Court,  
[t]he design is followed through in Article 36 of the Model Law 
in providing, in common with Article V of the New York 
Convention, for recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award 
to be refused at the request of a party against whom the arbitral 
award is invoked, if and to the extent that the party can furnish 
proof to the competent court of one or more specified grounds 
of refusal.72  
The Model Law therefore limits and regulates the powers of the courts 
in respect of arbitral awards. The High Court summarized the grounds 
provided by the Model Law as applied in Australia as follows:  
Those grounds include: that the arbitration agreement is not 
valid under its governing law; that the award deals with a 
dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of 
the submission to arbitration or contains decisions on matters 
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration; and that the 
composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was 
not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. Whether 
one or more of those grounds is established is an objective 
question to be determined by the competent court on the 
evidence and submissions before it, unaffected by the 
competence of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction 
under Article 16 of the Model Law. Arbitration in this way 
remains “the manifestation of parties’ choice to submit present 
or future issues between them to arbitration” in that, without 
                                                        
71 The Model Law, arts. 5, 34, 36. 
72 TCL Aircon, ¶ 12. 
372 7(2) CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 357   [2014 
“specific authority” to do so, arbitrators “cannot by their own 
decision . . . create or extend the authority conferred upon 
them.”73  
The listed grounds for non-enforcement of arbitral awards given to the 
courts appear to be exclusive. In TCL Aircon the High Court expressed that 
the ambit of s 36 was as follows: “Article 36(1) provides for the only 
grounds on which recognition or enforcement of an award may be refused 
by a competent court” (emphasis added).74 The judges further stated that 
“Article 5 limits the power of a court to intervene in matters governed by 
the Model Law to those categories of curial intervention provided for in the 
Model Law”. 75  An agreement between the parties to an arbitration 
agreement to include a right of review or appeal, or otherwise avoid finality 
of the award, may create a conflict between the following applicable 
principles: 
(1) the principle that the court will give effect to the agreement of the
parties; and
(2) the principle that the court would only refuse enforcement of an award
on grounds that fall within Article 36 of the Model Law – an incorrect
finding on fact or law (which would likely be the basis on which
review/appeal is sought) do not fall within the grounds for review in Article
36 of the Model Law.
The question is whether it is possible in Australia, or should be 
possible in Australia, to guard the parties’ interest in a correct award and 
allow for contractually expanded judicial review clauses. 
The High Court in TCL Aircon interpreted Article 34 of the Model Law 
as having the same limitations as Article 36. The High Court stated:  
Article 34(1), relied upon by TCL in its separate proceedings in 
the Federal Court to set aside the awards, provides that 
“[r]ecourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made 
only by an application for setting aside” the award and only on 
the grounds set out in Article 34(2), which substantially mirror 
those in Article 36(1) limiting the grounds upon which a court 
may refuse to recognise or enforce a foreign award.76 
The effect of these points is not fully addressed by the High Court in TCL 
Aircon.  
73 Id.  
74 TCL Aircon, ¶ 53.  
75 Id.  
76 TCL Aircon, ¶ 76. 
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A recent decision of the Federal Court of Australia, Emerald Grain 
Australia Pty Ltd v Agrocorp International Pte Ltd [2014] FCA 414, 
however confirmed that a court has no jurisdiction to review an arbitral 
tribunal’s finding on fact even if the award is wrong on the facts. The court 
held: 
 A dissatisfied party to an arbitral award is not given a right of 
appeal to challenge a tribunal’s findings of fact, and a court 
which is asked to set aside an award must be vigilant not to treat 
a challenge to an arbitral award on the grounds of it being in 
conflict with the rules of natural justice like an appeal 
challenging the facts found by a first instance tribunal from 
which an appeal may lie. It is not for the court to examine the 
facts of the case afresh and to revisit in full the questions that 
were before the Tribunal …. The court’s task in applications of 
the kind brought by [the plaintiff] is not to consider the 
correctness of the facts found by the Tribunal but to determine 
whether the Tribunal in finding the facts (whether correctly or 
incorrectly) did so in breach of the rules of natural justice.77  
On the facts of this case, however, the arbitration agreement did not include 
a contractually expanded judicial review clause.  
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that arbitration as a process 
functions within the broader legal framework in a country. Ultimately 
public power – i.e. the limits set by the sovereign – will define the extent of 
private power.78 Statute (or sovereign power) allows for the role of party 
autonomy, and allows for party autonomy as an exercise of private power 
to limit the exercise of sovereign (public) power, within certain limits.  
77 Emerald Grain Australia Pty Ltd v. Agrocorp International Pte Ltd (2014) FCA 414, ¶ 10 
(Austl.). The court cited the following cases in support: Uganda Telecom Ltd v. Hi-Tech Telecom 
Pty Ltd (2011) 277 ALR 415, at 439, ¶ 132 (Austl.); Traxys Europe SA v. Balaji Coke Industry Pvt 
Ltd (No 2) (2012) 201 FCR 535, at 557, ¶ 96 (Austl.). 
78 Richard Posner, in the case of Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 
1994) – “Indeed, short of authorizing trial by battle or ordeal or, more doubtfully, by a panel of 
three monkeys, parties can stipulate to whatever procedure they want to govern the arbitration of 
their disputes”, as referred to by Katherine A Helm, See generally Katherine A. Helm, The 
Expanding Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Where Does the Buck Stop? 61(4) 
DISP. RESOL. 1 (2006 – 2007). 
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VI. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTEREST IN THE 
QUALITY OF ARBITRAL AWARDS AND CONTRACTUALLY 
EXPANDED REVIEW CLAUSES AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTY 
AUTONOMY 
Notwithstanding the absence of a specific pronouncement by the High 
Court of Australia on the problems associated with an incorrect award, the 
principles reinforced by the High Court – namely the importance of party 
autonomy and the principles of contract in the arbitral process – indicate 
that protection against an award that is incorrect could be provided by the 
parties themselves as such an approach would not be inconsistent with the 
fundamental principles accepted by the High Court of Australia. While 
there are limitations on courts in relation to the grounds on which arbitral 
awards can be refused enforcement under Article 36 of the Model Law, 
there are no direct limits in the Model Law (and the IAA) on parties and on 
what they may choose to include in the drafting of the arbitration 
agreement (subject to the general limitations imposed by public policy, 
civil procedure, the laws of the country and the rules of natural justice). 
In fact, the analysis of party autonomy in TCL Aircon confirming the 
role of party autonomy in arbitration leads to the logical conclusion that the 
parties would also in principle be able to contractually regulate the binding 
nature of the arbitral award, or the rights of the parties on the receipt of the 
award.  
Parties are not specifically prohibited by the Model Law from drafting 
specific clauses protecting the parties against incorrect awards, and nothing 
in the TCL Aircon decision seems to indicate that the parties may in 
principle not use their contracting autonomy to protect themselves against 
an incorrect award. In Germany, for example, the German Supreme Court 
gave effect to an arbitration clause that created arbitral awards that were not 
immediately binding on the parties. 
A. A Provisionally Binding Arbitral Award: Claimant v Defendant, 
Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court], III ZB 07/06, 1 March 2007 
The arbitration agreement in this contract that came before the German 
Supreme Court specified that:  
[t]he outcome of the arbitration can be recognized by both 
parties as conclusive, final and binding on both parties. If one of 
the parties is dissatisfied with the outcome of the arbitration, it 
shall commence a court action within a month from the date of 
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the arbitral decision. If this time limit expires, the arbitral 
decision shall be final and binding on both parties. . . .79  
In interpreting whether this clause violated the German Civil Procedure 
Code (Zivilprozessordnung)80, which incorporates the Model Law with the 
2006 amendments,81 the Court placed a high degree of importance on party 
autonomy. “The arbitral award receives its binding force (see Sec. 1055 
ZPO) from the parties’ consensus to refer a certain dispute to a decision 
[taken] in arbitral proceedings”.82 This focus lead the Court to conclude 
that due to the contractual nature of arbitration, parties should be free to 
specify any conditions on the binding nature of their arbitral award. 
The reasoning of the German Supreme Court is similar to that of the 
High Court as expressed in TCL Aircon, where the principle of party 
autonomy was strongly supported.83 In similar circumstances, where the 
finality of an arbitral award is not subjected to later review, but is 
potentially suspended for a period in which parties can pursue other dispute 
resolutions avenues, an Australian court could conceivably reach the same 
conclusion as the German Supreme Court. The reason is that both Australia 
and Germany have adopted the Model Law in their domestic legislation,84 
and the Model Law is interpreted in both jurisdictions by taking into 
consideration its international origin and the need to promote uniformity.85 
This approach would alter the balance between party autonomy and finality 
more in favour of party autonomy. International precedent is persuasive in 
domestic decisions relating to international commercial arbitration where 
the Model Law is involved.86  Accordingly the door in Australia to the 
enforcement of at least some type of contractually expanded review clause, 
or a clause with a similar effect, may not be completely closed. In fact, it is 
probable that an Australian court could come to the same conclusion – 
namely that party autonomy allows parties to suspend the effectiveness of 
an arbitral award for an agreed period of time in which parties may resort to 
litigation - if faced with the need to interpret a similar clause.  
79 Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court], III ZB 07/06, in YEARBOOK OF COM. ARB.: VOL. XXXIII 
231, 232 (Albert Jan Van Den Berg ed., 2008).  
80 Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl.] I (Ger.) 
[hereinafter ZPO]. 
81 Id.  
82 Van Den Berg, supra note 79, at 234. 
83 TCL Aircon, ¶ 15. 
84 See generally the Model Law; ZPO; International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), sch. 2 (Austl.). 
85  TCL Aircon, ¶ 7; the Model Law art. 2A(1). See generally Luke Nottage, International 
Commercial Arbitration in Australia: What’s New and What’s Next?, 30 (5) J. INT'L ARB. 465  
(2013). Nottage emphasizes the need for Australia to adopt an “international” approach to 
interpretation of the IAA. 
86 The purpose of the Model Law was harmonization. See JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 27-28 (2003). 
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If Australia were to adopt this approach to the Model Law, then it 
would enable parties to customise their arbitral and potential review 
process as they see fit and give effect to their interest in the quality of the 
arbitral award.   
VII. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF ALLOWING CONTRACTUALLY 
EXPANDED REVIEW 
The issue is whether in Australia the focus on finality and enforcement 
will be prejudicial to the interest of the parties in a quality award and 
review, or whether Australia will support both. The Model Law has been 
interpreted as containing exhaustive grounds for the setting aside or denial 
of the enforcement of an award at Article 34 and 36 respectively. Further, 
Art 5 of the Model Law indicates that courts should not intervene in 
matters governed by the Model Law except where provided for by the 
Model Law.87 A reading of these articles together would suggest that a 
court in a Model Law jurisdiction cannot intervene in the event of an error 
of law on the face of an award as it would be contrary to the Model Law. 
However, the Model Law’s restrictions are aimed at courts, not the parties 
in the drafting of their arbitration agreement, and the public interest in both 
finality and quality of arbitral awards may and should be protected. The 
ability for parties to protect both interests exists. 
One of the key problems that could however arise if arbitral awards can 
be only provisionally binding, or if they are subject to some form of review 
or appeal, is whether the dispute resolution process followed can still be 
construed to be arbitration. To a large extent arbitration has been deemed to 
be the private determination of disputes by an independent third party or 
parties in a manner that is binding on the parties to the dispute. Perhaps the 
correct question, however, is whether arbitration as a dispute resolution 
procedure should be constrained to a specific procedure and under a 
specific name. A number of more recent forms of alternative dispute 
resolution, such as “med-arbs” or “arb-med-arbs”, fall outside of the 
traditional concepts of “mediation” and “arbitration”. To be bound to 
arbitrary or perhaps out-dated definitions of a specific dispute resolution 
process appears to be somewhat dogmatic, and not in keeping with 
developments in private dispute resolution processes. However, in order to 
assist parties who wish to agree to a more nuanced form of arbitration and 
include a contractually agreed review mechanism in their arbitration 
agreement, an institutional form of appeal does appear to be attractive. The 
relevant arbitral institution would ideally offer such a process, and a 
                                                        
87 The Model Law art. 5.  
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contractually expanded review clause should be provided as an option in 
the institutional rules. 
There are both potential benefits and disadvantages to allowing judicial 
review of arbitral awards and observing contractually expanded judicial 
review clauses (including clauses suspending the immediate operation of 
arbitral awards).  
Judicial review of arbitral awards has historically been limited, as it 
can undermine some of the most important benefits of arbitration, such as 
efficiency in dispute resolution and the avoidance of long and expensive 
litigation.88 Adding a fourth tier (on top of the typical alternative dispute 
resolution process of conciliation, mediation and arbitration) could in fact 
constitute a “point of inferiority”. 89  One disadvantage is the loss of 
efficiency, which, along with speed, is often cited as some of the key 
benefits of arbitration. In judicial review, “speed and cheapness are not 
manifest in the process”.90 Further, when proceedings continue in court, the 
benefit of confidentiality is lost. 91 Some other benefits of arbitration may 
also be forfeited, including the ability of the arbitrators to come up with 
creative solutions, and the whole process may become more court-like with 
arbitrators required to write findings in the style of judgments.92   
There are however also advantages. The most compelling argument in 
favour of allowing judicial review of arbitral awards and enforcing 
contractually expanded judicial review is the parties’ interest in fairness.93 
A “maverick arbitrator may render an egregious decision that is completely 
at odds with the law, or unjustified by the factual evidence, and nonetheless 
unreviewable”. 94  The “hybrid procedure” 95  of arbitration with the 
possibility of judicial review would prevent such a situation. Further, from 
a broader perspective, if judicial review is permitted, parties who are 
uncomfortable with the thought of binding but potentially incorrect 
decisions may be more likely to embark on a process of arbitration, if the 
decision can be reviewed, rather than avoid arbitration altogether and 
increasing the burden on state courts.96 Apart from the parties’ interest in 
fairness, there is also a public policy interest in observing the law. The law 
                                                        
88 Margaret Moses, Party Agreements to Expand Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 20 (3) J. 
INT'L ARB. 315, 315 (2003). 
89 Westport Insurance Corporation v. Gordian Runoff Ltd, [2011] HCA 37, ¶ 111 (Austl.). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Moses, supra note 88, at 315. 
93 See e.g., Hossein Abedian, Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards in International Arbitration – A 
Case for an Efficient System of Judicial Review, 28 (6) J. INT'L ARB. 553, 553(2011). 
94 Moses, supra note 88, at 315. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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of the land does, and should, carry “significant weight”.97 In addition to the 
clear benefit to the parties in protecting their interest in the correctness of 
the arbitral award, there is an undeniable broader public interest in 
protecting the quality of arbitral awards.  
Although arbitration is generally also considered to be a less expensive 
method of dispute resolution,98 and would therefore be the preferred option 
of parties,99 the economic argument in favour of finality in arbitration does 
have its limits.  
[T]he parties have the freedom to choose between arbitrators 
and courts. If they have this freedom, they will simply choose 
the superior forum. And if the superior forum is actually some 
combination of arbitration and courts – such as . . . some 
minimal or substantial level of review of arbitration awards – 
they will choose that combination as well.100 
It is acknowledged that one of the two most popular destinations for 
international commercial arbitration in the Asia Pacific region, Singapore, 
explicitly does not allow judicial review of arbitral awards. In addition, the 
rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre provide for final and 
binding awards, and that the parties irrevocably waive their right to “any 
form of appeal, review or recourse to any state court or other judicial 
authority insofar as such waiver may be validly made”.101 It is unclear 
whether the strict approach on the finality of arbitral awards in Singapore 
has any causal connection to it being a preferred destination for 
international arbitration, as “finality” of awards does not appear to be one 
of the key considerations for the choice of the arbitral seat.102 
It should nevertheless be considered whether a hybrid procedure of 
arbitration with the option of judicial review (1) is needed, (2) will serve a 
“valuable purpose”, 103  and (3) whether it would “impact adversely on 
arbitration generally”.104  
                                                        
97 Tòmas Kennedy-Grant, The New Zealand Experience of the UNCITRAL Model Law: A Review 
of the Position as at 31 December 2007, 4 (1) ASIAN INT'L ARB. J. 1, 3 (2008). 
98 Eric A. Posner, Should International Arbitration Awards Be Reviewable?, present at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 5-8, 2000). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 SIAC Arbitration Rules rule 28.9. Jennifer Kirby, Finality and Arbitral Rules: Saying An Award 
is Final Does Not Necessarily Make It So, 29 (1) J. INT'L ARB. 119, 119 -120 (2012).  
102 WHITE & CASE, supra note 52. 
103 Moses, supra note 88, at 315. 
104 Id.  
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There is scholarly opinion 105  that not all contracts and contracting 
parties are equal and that a one-size-fits-all approach to rejecting review of 
arbitral decisions may not be desirable. In fact, such an approach itself may 
be contrary to public policy. Further, the review of arbitral decisions is not 
generally legally unacceptable.106 Consideration has also been given for the 
creation of specific arbitral appeal/review panels,107 and countries such as 
Australia allow appeals of domestic arbitral awards.108  
Certain countries allow a right of review, such as the United Kingdom, 
which allows for appeal on a question of law,109 and New Zealand, which 
has a special option to include the right of review. The New Zealand model 
of international arbitration offers a flexible approach, and is set out briefly 
below as an example of a flexible legislative framework that accommodates 
judicial review of arbitral awards.  
The position in New Zealand, a Model Law jurisdiction, can therefore 
also serve as an important comparator for Australia. The New Zealand 
Arbitration Act 110  provides in Schedule 2 Clause 5 the possibility for 
parties to an international arbitration to contractually opt in to court review 
of arbitral awards containing errors of law. Clause 5(1) states that: 
Notwithstanding anything in Articles 5 or 34 of the First 
Schedule, any party may appeal to the High Court on any 
question of law arising out of an award – 
(a) if the parties have so agreed before the making of that award; 
or 
(b) with the consent of every other party given after the making 
of that award; or 
(c) with the leave of the High Court.111 
Clause 5(2) creates a statutory threshold for granting leave for appeal: 
                                                        
105 See generally Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 HARV. 
NEGOTIATION L. REV. 171 (2003). 
106 See Arbitration Act, 1996, art. 69 (Eng.) and Arbitration Act, 1996, sch. 2 c. 5 (N.Z.). 
107 See generally Irene M. Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 
44 INT'L L. & POL. 1109 (2012).  
108 An appeal to the Supreme Court is possible on any question of law (section 38(2) of the 
Uniform Acts) with either the consent of all parties or where the court grants special leave (section 
38(4) of the Uniform Acts), s 34A of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 (NSW), Commercial 
Arbitration Act 2013 (QLD), Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 (Vic), Commercial Arbitration 
(National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT), Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 (SA), 
Commercial Arbitration Act 2012 (WA).  
109 See Arbitration Act, 1996, art. 69 (Eng.). The United Kingdom has however not adopted the 
Model Law. 
110 See generally Arbitration Act, 1996 (N. Z.) This act was amended in 2007 to include the 
opportunity for review of arbitral awards. 
111 Id. sch. 2, c. 5. 
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“The High Court shall not grant leave under subclause (1)(c) unless it 
considers that, having regard to all the circumstances, the determination of 
the question of law concerned could substantially affect the rights of one or 
more of the parties”.112 
The advantage of this opt-in system is that it provides the uniformity of 
the Model Law as the default position, but provides parties with the ability 
to customise their agreement if they so require.  
This position would seem more “arbitration-friendly” – both from the 
perspective of contracting parties, as well as from a legal theoretical 
perspective, by giving a broader scope to party autonomy. 
The benefit of the approach of the New Zealand Arbitration Act is that 
it avoids the ‘one size fits all approach’ of the current Australian IAA. In 
fact, not all contracting and arbitrating parties are the same, and the “binary 
approach” to contractually expanded review of arbitral awards has been 
criticised,113 with support being expressed in favour of “a continuum” and 
“a more textured approach”.114 Further, the possibility of review or appeal 
of arbitral awards is not completely foreign to the notion of arbitration. 
Apart from the provision for review in Article 36 of the Model Law, some 
commentators have expressed support for an arbitral appeals process (i.e. 
where the review or appeal is conducted by a further arbitral institution.)115  
VIII. CONTRACTUALLY EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW – A 
POSSIBILITY IN AUSTRALIA? 
The process of making Australia a competitive centre for international 
commercial arbitration is likely not complete.116 Australia is disadvantaged 
by its geographical separation,117  and in order to be a popular or even 
preferred destination for international commercial arbitration, Australia 
would likely have to do more.118 The fact that a constitutional challenge to 
                                                        
112 Id. sch. 2, c. 5(2). 
113 Goldman, supra note 105, at 174. He specifically notes that “[v]irtually all of the discussion to 
date has assumed that the answer to the question of enforceability is either yes or no.” This article 
rejects this binary approach. Rather, this article assumes that the circumstances in which such 
clauses appear represent a continuum and accordingly adopts a more textured analysis. 
114 Id., at 201. It should be noted however that Goldman’s comments are made mostly in the 
context of domestic arbitration in the United States, and that he acknowledges the difficulties of the 
issues at hand. It is therefore his view that contractually expanded review clauses should only be 
enforced if they are specifically agreed to by the arbitral parties, and not if they are included in 
standard form contracts. 
115 Cate, supra note 107, at 1128. See generally Erin E Gleason, International Arbitral Appeals: 
What Are We So Afraid of ?, 7 (2) PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 269 (2007). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Nottage proposes that arbitration in Australia should be more tailored to the needs of the parties, 
and that the whole culture of arbitration would have to change in Australia. Nottage, supra note 85, 
at 465-66. 
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the validity of the IAA failed, may on its own not assuage parties’ concerns 
about arbitrating in Australia (given that incorrect decisions will bind 
parties and that they may have not recourse against such decisions). It may 
also not persuade parties to choose Australia as a seat of arbitration or 
choose Australian law as the governing law of the arbitration agreement. 
Apart from the suggestions that have been made to increase Australia’s 
popularity as a destination for international commercial arbitration, 119 
consideration should also be given to the needs of the type of parties who, 
in the words of Keane JA, are “well-resourced and well-advised” and “who 
engage in international trade on a global scale”.120 These parties can be 
expected to “customise their agreements to their particular needs, both in 
terms of the allocation of the risks of their venture, and in their choice of 
dispute resolution mechanisms”.121 Contractually expanded judicial review 
clauses in arbitration agreements could serve such parties well – and 
provided that such clauses are drafted in a manner that could render the 
clause enforceable under the IAA, or the IAA is amended to accommodate 
contractually expanded judicial review in the same manner as the New 
Zealand Arbitration Act, parties could add a potential fourth tier to their 
adjudication process.122 These could be important considerations for parties 
considering contractually expanded judicial review. There is however no 
information available on the case loads of ACICA, or any details or 
specifics of international arbitration in Australia.  
In the absence of legislation that specifically allows for contractually 
expanded review of arbitral awards in Australia, the question of the 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement providing for review of an arbitral 
award would depend on curial interpretation. Legislative reform may be 
required to provide certainty. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that Australia may be arbitration-friendly from 
the point of view that arbitral awards will be enforced, but that it may only 
be fully “arbitration-friendly” if there is the possibility to enforce 
contractually expanded review clauses. A country that protects both the 
interest in finality and enforcement of arbitral awards and the interest in the 
quality of arbitral awards, and will further give full effect to the meaning of 
                                                        
119 Id. 
120 PA Keane, The prospects for international arbitration in Australia, present at AMTAC (by 
video-conference, Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/publications/judges-speeches/ 
speeches-former-judges/chief-justice-keane/keane-cj-20120925. 
121 Id. 
122 The first three tiers being conciliation (or some form of negotiation), mediation and arbitration.  
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